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Previous experiments have demonstrated that by 4 years of age children can use
information from a past episode to solve a problem for the very next future episode.
However, it remained unclear whether 4-year-olds can similarly use such information to
solve a problem for a more removed future episode that is not of immediate concern. In
the current study we introduced 4-year-olds to problems in one room before taking them
to another room and distracting them for 15min. The children were then offered a choice
of items to place into a bucket that was to be taken back to the first room when a 5-min
sand-timer had completed a cycle. Across two conceptually distinct domains, the children
placed the item that could solve the deferred future problem above chance level. This
result demonstrates that by 48 months many children can recall a problem from the past
and act in the present to solve that problem for a deferred future episode. We discuss
implications for theories about the nature of episodic foresight.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of human cognition involves mental time travel to past and
future episodes (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Smallwood et al.,
2011), a capacity that allows effective preparation for and active
shaping of future events (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997). At
their core, both episodic memory and episodic foresight require
self-projection into a non-current perspective (e.g., Buckner and
Carroll, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), and one might
therefore expect these abilities to draw on similar neurocognitive
resources and develop at a similar age. Supporting the case of neu-
rological similarity, both abilities engage similar brain networks
(Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng
and Grady, 2010); both show similar declines in old age (Addis
et al., 2008); and both are selectively impaired in hippocampus-
lesioned amnesiacs (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002; Hassabis
et al., 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2009). And indeed, children who
can accurately report events from yesterday are more likely to
accurately report events that will happen tomorrow (Busby and
Suddendorf, 2005; Suddendorf, 2010; Hayne et al., 2011). These
commonalities support the view of episodic memory as a cru-
cial design feature of the episodic foresight system (Suddendorf
and Busby, 2005). Episodic memories provide a rich database
of information that can be mentally recombined into similar
and even entirely novel future episodes to guide prudent behav-
ior (Schacter and Addis, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).
Only recently, however, have studies begun to examine when and
how this capacity to link past, present and future develops in
children.
The ability to use information from a past episode to pre-
pare in the present for a future episode is a useful test of mental
time travel in both non-verbal animals and children whose ver-
bal responses may belie their true cognitive abilities (Hampton
and Schwartz, 2004; Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Tulving, 2005;
Scarf et al., 2013). Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) distil four
criteria that studies of this capacity must meet in order to rule
out alternative explanations: (1) use of single trials, to avoid
conditioning and demonstrate memory for a specific event;
(2) use of novel problems, to engage cognitive processes and
eliminate learning history explanations; (3) use of separate spa-
tial/temporal contexts for the crucial future-directed action and
the future problem, to avoid cuing to the answer and demon-
strate long-term memory; and (4) use of multiple problems from
distinct domains, to demonstrate the domain-general nature of
the capacity. Compelling positive evidence meeting these cri-
teria has not yet been obtained for animals (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 2010), and some studies of children also fail to meet
them. In a recent study by Russell and colleagues (2010), for
example, the future problem was presently visible to the chil-
dren during the future-directed action (violating criterion 3),
such that the successful children did not necessarily have to base
their solution on a spatially and temporally removed mental
construction.
Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) designed a series of exper-
iments that did meet the four criteria outlined above. In one
of these, 3- and 4- year-olds were introduced to one of two
conceptually distinct problems in an initial testing room. The
“box task” involved a box with a triangle-shaped keyhole and
the “food task” involved a puppet that wanted to eat a banana.
In the instant condition, the child was led to the other side of
the room immediately after being presented with the problem,
and was allowed to choose a solution from a selection of three
options without being allowed to look back at the problem. In
the delay condition, the child was taken to a second room and
distracted for 15min. They were then offered the same choice for
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an immediate return to the first room. Importantly, the exper-
imenter did not refer to the problem in either condition, only
its location. In the instant condition, both 3- and 4-year-olds
selected the item that could solve the problem at levels close
to ceiling. In the delay condition, however, only the 4-year-olds
selected the item that secured the future solution significantly
above chance level.
These results clearly demonstrate the effect of a delay between
the relevant past event and the future-oriented action on chil-
dren’s ability to link past and future episodes. Only 4-year-olds
demonstrated a capacity to import a past event from long-term
memory into working memory and act for the future. Still, the
very next event following item selection was a return to the prob-
lem, and so, while the future problem had to be imagined, in
some sense it may have been part of the child’s psychological
present. Even 24-month-old children (Bauer et al., 1999) and
non-human great apes (Koehler, 1927; Döhl, 1968) show some
ability to mentally simulate and act for the “future,” when that
future is part of a single ongoing event and long-term memory
is not required. This ability likely relies on working memory in
much the same way as the ability to recall and manipulate infor-
mation that has been encountered in the very recent past. As
adults, however, we frequently prepare for more remote future
events, and we rely on our long-term memory for what was
required in similar past episodes to guide our future-oriented
actions. It is possible that imagining and acting for a deferred
future episode requires more executive resources than for a
future episode that has become of immediate concern, such as
the episode in Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) task. Would
4-year-olds be capable of solving this task if a series of irrel-
evant events was inserted between the future-directed action
and the return to the original problem? Can they link past
and future episodes that are both temporally removed from the
immediate?
Attempts to test for episodic foresight beyond the very next
event must overcome the difficult problem of how to inform a
child participant just when in the future their present behav-
ior will have an effect (Suddendorf et al., 2011). Young children,
especially those aged four and under, have considerable trou-
ble understanding and correctly using specific future-oriented
terms (Harner, 1975, 1980; Busby Grant and Suddendorf, 2010,
2011). Therefore, informing them that their choice of an item
will have an effect when they go to another room in “five min-
utes” or play a game “tomorrow” (e.g., Russell et al., 2010) would
be futile for a large proportion of young children. However,
as children generally understand concrete instantiations of con-
cepts earlier than they understand symbolic representations
(Uttal et al., 1997), it may be more effective to convey the
delay with a sand-timer. A previous study revealed that the
majority of 4-year-olds understand that a half empty sand-
timer will complete its cycle before a full one (Bischof-Köhler,
2000), suggesting that they correctly recognize something about
how the amount of sand in the compartments changes over
time.
The current experiment built on Suddendorf and colleagues’
(2011) methodology to test whether 4-year-olds could remember
a problematic past episode from 15min ago and prepare for
a deferred future episode marked by the completion of a
sand-timer’s cycle. Rather than choosing an item to immediately
take into the problem room, the children instead had to place
the item into a bucket, which they were previously told would
be taken to the problem room only when the timer had com-
pleted its cycle. The inclusion of the bucket crucially required
the children to physically separate themselves from their chosen
item, thus reinforcing the idea that the item was to be “saved”
for a deferred future episode rather than used in the immedi-
ate future. An instant condition with no delay in either temporal




Twenty-four 4-year-olds (M = 48months 17 days, SD = 14 days)
were included in the study. This group consisted of 10 boys
and 14 girls, who each participated individually with a parent
or caregiver present. Each child completed both the box task
and the food task, one in the instant condition and one in the
delayed condition. The orders of the tasks and conditions were
counterbalanced.
MATERIALS
The experimental materials for the box task and the food task
were identical to those used in experiment two of Suddendorf and
colleagues’ (2011) study, with the exception that more distracting
objects were included to lower the level of chance performance
and thus increase experimental power.
Box task
Two wooden boxes (14× 21× 21 cm) were used, each featuring
a large keyhole (either square- or triangle-shaped). Sliding an
appropriately-shaped key into these keyholes activated a mech-
anism that revealed a previously hidden platform within the box,
allowing objects to be retrieved from this platform. Seven differ-
ent keys were used, each consisting of a shape connected to a
19 cm rod. The seven shapes were: square, triangle, circle, star,
heart, teardrop, and an irregular zigzag shape.
Food task
Two commercially available hand puppets (a tiger and an ele-
phant) were used, along with seven plastic foods: strawberry,
banana, apple, pear, orange, grapes, and carrot.
Sand-timer and bucket
One commercially available cylindrical sand-timer (height 16 cm,
diameter 8 cm) with blue sand grains was used. The time of a
complete cycle was approximately 5min. A black bucket was also
used, in which the child was to place their selected item in the
delayed condition.
PROCEDURE
Prior to the main sequence of the experiment, the child was taken
to a warm-up room where they were introduced to the time-
keeping nature of the sand-timer. The sand-timer was turned
over and the child was asked to examine the sand falling from
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the top to the bottom compartment. The child was informed that
they would receive a sticker once all of the sand had reached the
bottom.
After this introduction, the child was taken to Room A,
referred to as “Charlie the chicken’s room” owing to a large poster
of a chicken on the wall. In this room they were presented with
the box task and the food task while seated at a child-friendly
table.
Box task
The experimenter introduced the child to the box with the
square-shaped hole, and demonstrated how to use the square-
shaped key to activate the mechanism and reveal a hidden toy.
The child was allowed to perform this action themselves, before
the demonstration was repeated and the child was allowed to
have a second attempt. This box was then removed and the box
with the triangle-shaped hole was introduced. The experimenter
demonstrated to the child that the square-shaped key did not
work on this box, and the child was allowed to confirm this for
themselves.
In the instant condition, the child was then led to the other
side of the room, containing a table with the triangle-shaped key
and five distracter keys. Without being able to look back at the
test table, the child was asked to pick one of these items to take
back.
In the delayed condition, the child was told that they would
go to another room (Room B) to play some games, and the box
with triangle-shaped keyhole was left on the table. After 15min
of unrelated activity in Room B, the child was reintroduced to
the sand-timer and shown the bucket. They were informed that
(1) they would be going back to Charlie the chicken’s room
after the sand-timer had completed a cycle, and (2) they would
be taking the bucket with them when they went. The child
was asked to independently generate these facts consecutively
to ensure that they understood exactly what would be happen-
ing and when. Finally, the experimenter revealed a previously
hidden tray containing the triangle-shaped key and the five dis-
tracter keys and invited the child to place one of these items only
into the bucket. After they had made their choice, the child was
asked to explain the reason for their selection. Upon comple-
tion of the sand-timer’s cycle, the child was invited to bring the
bucket with them to Room A where they could solve the problem
(the experimenter brought the correct item if the child had not
selected it).
Food task
The experimenter introduced the child to the tiger puppet. The
child was told that “Terry the tiger” liked to eat strawberries
and the child was allowed to “feed” the puppet using the visi-
ble plastic strawberry on the table. This procedure was repeated,
before the child was introduced to the elephant puppet and
told that “Ellie the elephant” liked to eat bananas. The exper-
imenter then pointed out that there were no bananas to feed
Ellie.
The instant and delayed conditions mirrored those of the box
task, except that the items available to choose were the plastic
banana and the five plastic food distracters.
RESULTS
A 2× 2 ANOVA (Task × Condition) revealed a main effect
of Condition, with the children selecting the correct item
significantly more often in the instant condition than the delayed
condition, F(1, 22) = 12.79, p = 0.002. There were no significant
effects involving Task, suggesting that the box and food tasks did
not vary in difficulty in either condition. There were also no sig-
nificant condition order effects, suggesting that the presentation
order of the instant and delayed conditions did not affect the
children’s performance. We have therefore collapsed across these
variables in the subsequent analyses.
As seen in Figure 1, the large majority of children selected
the appropriate item (91.7%) in the instant condition, a per-
formance that was well above chance level (16.7%), χ2(1) =
97.20, p < 0.001. This finding confirmed that the problems
themselves were conceptually easy when the temporal ele-
ment was absent. Although performance was decreased in
the delayed condition, the children still selected the appro-
priate item (50%) well above chance level, χ2(1) = 19.20,
p < 0.001.
The conclusion that the children displayed some foresight
when selecting the item in the delayed condition is supported
by their verbal responses. Across tasks, 25% of children made
reference to the future utility of the item when explaining their
choice. All of these children had selected the correct item, a per-
formance that was well above chance level, χ2(1) = 30.00, p <
0.001. Of the 75% of children that did not make future reference
when explaining their choice, one third of them had still selected
the correct item. Nevertheless, the rate of correct item selection
among this sub-sample was not significantly above chance level,
χ2(1) = 3.60, p = 0.058.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined whether 4-year-olds could remem-
ber a problem from a specific past episode and act in the present
to obtain a novel solution for a return to the problem in a deferred
future episode. In the delayed condition, the children had to
independently confirm their understanding that they would be
FIGURE 1 | Proportion of 4-year-olds who made the correct item choice
in the instant and delayed conditions (collapsed across the box and
food tasks).
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returning to RoomAwith the bucket after the familiar sand-timer
had completed its cycle. This process ensured that the children
understood the item they subsequently placed into the bucket
was not to be used in the immediate future, but rather saved for
the deferred future episode in Room A. And, although they did
not perform at the same level as in the instant condition, they
still selected the correct item well above chance level. The cur-
rent study therefore demonstrates, for the first time, that many
4-year-olds can use information from past episodes to prepare
for deferred future episodes, just as they can for otherwise iden-
tical future episodes of immediate concern (Suddendorf et al.,
2011).
The findings of the current study add to the growing
developmental literature that has emerged following recent
widespread recognition of the importance of human episodic
foresight and its links to episodic memory (Science, 2007).
Developmental milestones appear to be achieved over the
preschool years (Suddendorf and Moore, 2011; Suddendorf
and Redshaw, in press). During this period, children begin
to show competence on tasks requiring them to delay grat-
ification for the future (Mischel et al., 1989; Moore et al.,
1998; Garon et al., 2012), save resources for the future (Atance
and Meltzoff, 2005; Metcalf and Atance, 2011), place multi-
ple future episodes in time relative to each other (Friedman,
2000; Busby Grant and Suddendorf, 2009; Hayne et al., 2011;
Hudson and Mayhew, 2011), learn a rule to be applied in
the future (Kliegel and Jäger, 2007), plan an intervention that
will help a character in the future (McColgan and Mccormack,
2008; McCormack and Hanley, 2011), and evaluate the likeli-
hood of future events (Lagattuta and Sayfan, 2011). The cur-
rent study documents the development of another key future-
oriented capacity: adaptively linking past and deferred future
episodes.
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATURE OF EPISODIC FORESIGHT
The performance of the 4-year-olds in the delayed condition
(50% success, with a chance level of 16.7%) closely matches that
of the 4-year-olds in Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) second
experiment, in which the future episode immediately followed the
crucial future-oriented action (58.3% success, with a chance level
of 33.3%). Perhaps then, as long as the relevant past episode can
be imported into working memory, we can use the same cognitive
mechanism to prepare for a similar future episode whether that
future episode is the very next event or several minutes removed.
So, as long as we can remember the shampoo bottle running out
last night, we can use the same mechanism to replace it with a
full one whether we are going to shower immediately or in prepa-
ration for a shower in 5min time. This observation raises the
possibility that the same mechanism can be used to prepare for
even more distant future episodes, such as next summer’s holi-
day, again as long as the relevant past episode is recalled. 1 Such
1This is not to say we are equally motivated to prepare for immediate and dis-
tant future events, as a large body of temporal discounting literature disproves
(e.g., Green et al., 1994; Green and Myerson, 2004). Future events are increas-
ingly uncertain as they move further away, and so our lack of enthusiasm for
preparing for distant episodes is sometimes justified. Still, the current study
an interpretation is consistent with the strong neurological links
between episodic memory and episodic foresight described in
the introduction, and with the idea that episodic memory may
have evolved as a crucial design feature of the episodic foresight
system.
If imagining immediate and deferred future episodes can be
achieved with the same basic mechanism, then it may follow that
children (and adults) will tend to use this mechanism as a heuris-
tic when preparing for any deferred future episode—even when
additional mechanisms are required. Consistent with Read and
Loewenstein’s (1995) time contraction hypothesis, we may typ-
ically imagine and prepare for any future episode as if it were
occurring in the immediate future; as if the current self were
placed into that episode with a time machine. Nevertheless, our
current motivation, emotion, and knowledge states are not always
the same as our future states, and so we must sometimes prepare
for a deferred future episode containing a self that differs from
the current self on some important dimension (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 1997). Both children (Atance and Meltzoff, 2006) and
adults (Nisbett and Kanouse, 1969) often fail to take this differ-
ence into account when required, despite the fact that 4-year-olds
are beginning to demonstrate a capacity to imagine minds with
distinct states to their own (Wellman et al., 2001). These specific
theory-of-future-mind failingsmay be explained by the routine use
of a generally successful heuristic that places the current self into
the future episode.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The current study was designed only to answer the specific ques-
tion of whether 4-year-olds could prepare for a deferred future
event just as they can for the very next future event, and we
found that indeed they could. Future studies may want to vary
the temporal delay between the item selection and the future
event. It is possible that the same basic mechanism can be used
to prepare for an immediate future event and one that is happen-
ing in 5min, but additional mechanisms are required to prepare
for an event happening next year. Such a finding would pro-
vide evidence against the heuristic view we have presented above,
which theoretically should apply to any non-immediate future
event. Other studies may want to vary the temporal period in
which an item becomes useful, such that the item that is use-
ful immediately is not the same one that is useful in 5min or
in 10min. Selecting only the time-appropriate item may require
complex inhibition skills, which 4-year-olds are still in the pro-
cess of learning (Gerstadt et al., 1994; Diamond and Taylor,
1998).
In conclusion, the current study has demonstrated, for the
first time, that 4-year-olds can remember a problem from
a specific past episode and act to solve that problem for a
deferred future episode, just as they can for the very next future
episode. Future-oriented action may be achievable with the
same episodic foresight mechanism whether or not intermedi-
ate events are located between that action and the relevant future
episode.
may indeed suggest that linking past events with deferred future events is not
more cognitively demanding in principle than for immediate future events.
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